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Outkicking the Coverage: The Unionization of
College Athletes
INTRODUCTION
Few industries have experienced the growth that college football has
sustained in recent decades.1 The athletes are bigger, the stadiums are
cathedrals, and revenues of major college football programs have soared
to unprecedented heights.2 This surge in popularity has induced substantial
changes to the sport and has given rise to numerous issues that must be
addressed if college football is to maintain its meteoric rise.3 The evolving
role of student-athletes has created questions regarding how these
individuals fit into the modern landscape of college football; in particular,
the issue has arisen regarding whether athletes may be considered
employees for the purposes of federal labor law. Recently, a group of
scholarship football players at Northwestern University attempted to
answer this question.4
In January 2014, the College Athletic Players Association (“CAPA”)
petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”) to represent
a collective bargaining unit consisting of scholarship football players at
Northwestern University.5 In doing so, the athletes presented a novel
question: are college athletes considered employees for purposes of federal
labor law standards? If so, then these athletes are entitled to the rights
prescribed to all employees under the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”), including the right to unionize and collectively bargain; if they
are not employees, then they are excluded from coverage under the Act
and are not entitled to any of the rights granted therein. Ultimately, the

Copyright 2016, by TIM ROBINSON.
1. See Eric Chemi, The Amazing Growth in College Football Revenues,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 27, 2013, 12:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
articles/2013-09-26/the-amazing-growth-in-college-football-revenues [https://perma
.cc/BF4H-SVYX].
2. See id.
3. See Kieran McCauley, College Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid, DAILY LOCAL
NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.dailylocal.com/article/DL/20150428/SPORTS
/150429826 [https://perma.cc/53FQ-5WUW].
4. Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats
-football-players-trying-join-labor-union [https://perma.cc/B6UL-Y5Z4].
5. Id.
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NLRB eluded the question for policy reasons.6 However, the question
remains—what is the status of college athletes under federal labor law?
This Comment attempts to predict the outcome of this important issue.
Part I provides background on the administrative domain that will
determine the status of college athletes. Discussing factors relevant to this
determination, Part II explains the National Labor Relations Board’s prior
decisions involving college students—specifically, graduate students
performing teaching and research duties in return for some form of
financial aid. Part III presents the recent petition filed by the Northwestern
University scholarship football players and analyzes both the regional
director’s original decision and the most recent decision issued by the
National Labor Relations Board in August 2015. Finally, Part IV offers a
two-pronged solution in which the NLRB would recognize scholarship
college athletes as employees under the NLRA and subsequently establish
a separate class of employees that retains certain rights under the Act but
is restricted from collective bargaining.
I. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act7 on July 5, 1935,
marking the beginning of modern federal regulation of labor relations. The
NLRA embodies the national labor policy of the United States and
provides the framework by which employers and employees interact, in
the context of both union and non-union activity.
A. Background and Purpose of the Act
The primary function of the Act was to promote peace between labor
and management.8 In response to instability arising from employers’
unwillingness to recognize certain rights of employees, Congress sought
6. Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union Bid, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrbsays-northwestern-football-players-cannot-unionize.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VYJ5
-TLF7].
7. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
8. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 27–28 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 6th ed.
2012) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. There is some discussion
among commentators that the purpose of promoting industrial peace has been
overstated by the Board and that the Act was actually meant to act as a weapon
against the Great Depression. See, e.g., Kenneth Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An
Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV.
285, 320–22 (1987).
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to protect those rights by encouraging collective bargaining, and, further,
to curtail certain private sector labor and management practices that were
harmful to the national economy.9
Relevant sections of the NLRA define and protect the rights of employers
and employees. Section 2 provides definitions for the entire Act, including
“employer” and “employee.”10 Section 7 expressly lists employee rights that
are protected by the Act, and section 8 safeguards these rights by prohibiting
“unfair labor practices” by employers.11 Finally, section 9 creates the process
by which the National Labor Relations Board conducts representation
proceedings.12 Any inquiry into the status of college athletes necessarily
begins with an analysis of these sections of the NLRA.
B. Section 2(3): Employees
The NLRA defines “employee” broadly in section 2(3), declaring,
“the term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited
to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly
states otherwise.”13 The Board generally finds little difficulty in applying
the broad definition found in section 2(3).14 With few exceptions, if an
individual is not in an excluded category of employees and works for an
employer, the Board will assume that the individual is covered by the
Act.15
The NLRA originally did not plainly exclude independent contractors
from coverage. However, as amended by the 1947 Labor Management
Relations Act (the “Taft-Hartley Act”), section 2(3) provides that the term
“employee” shall not include “any individual having the status of an
independent contractor.”16 The Supreme Court has found that Congress’s
purpose for excluding independent contractors was to have the Board and
9. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS
TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1 (1997).

BD., BASIC GUIDE

10. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
11. Id. §§ 157–158.
12. Id. § 159.
13. Id. § 152(3).
14. Id. § 152(3) (citing as exceptions to the definition of “employee” (1)
agricultural laborers; (2) laborers in domestic service of any family or person at
his home; (3) individuals employed by his parent or spouse; (4) independent
contractors; (5) supervisor; (6) individuals employed by employers subject to the
Railway Labor Act; and (7) any individual employed by any other person who is
not an employer as defined by the Act).
15. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2836.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
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courts apply the common law agency test in distinguishing between
employees and independent contractors.17
United Insurance is the preeminent guide for the Board to distinguish
between employees and independent contractors, and recent Supreme Court
decisions have affirmed the use of common law principles as the test for
determining employee status.18 In NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.,
the Court explained that when there is doubt as to Congress’s intended
meaning of a term, courts should infer that Congress intended to incorporate
the “established meaning of [the] term.”19 Thus, when Congress uses the term
“employee” without defining it, it should be inferred that Congress meant to
incorporate the conventional master-servant relationship set forth by common
law agency doctrine.20 The NLRB also recognizes the application of the
common law agency principles to the determination of employee status and
applies the master-servant test.21 The Restatement (Second) of Agency
defines a “servant” as “an agent employed by a master to perform service in
his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is
controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.”22 Therefore,
when questions arise over the employee status of certain individuals, as in the
case of scholarship student-athletes, the Board will analyze, among other
factors, whether the individual performs services under the control and
direction of the employer and whether the individual is compensated for
these services.23

17. NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
18. See Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 849 (1998); NLRB v.
Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 89 (1995) (explaining that the determination
as to employee status under the Act must be based on the ordinary meaning of the
term “employee” as reflected in the common law concept of a “master-servant”
relationship); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
19. 516 U.S. at 94 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 233–23
(quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40(1989)).
20. Id. The common law master-servant relationship exists when “a servant
performs services for another, under the other’s control or right of control, and in
return for payment.” N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1206 (2000).
21. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 90 at *4–5, Aug. 23,
2016 (quoting Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. at 94) (“But it is well established
that ‘when Congress uses the term ‘employee’ in a statute that does not define the
term, courts interpreting the statute ‘must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates,
that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning’’ of the term, with
reference to ‘common-law agency doctrine.’”).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
23. See id.
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C. Section 7: Rights of Employees
The principal concern of the NLRA is the protection of employees’
rights, both individually and collectively.24 To effectuate this policy,
Congress promulgated section 7, which sets forth the rights afforded to
covered individuals.25 The Act offers protection to employees for unionized
activities or conduct unrelated to union organizations, as well as the right to
abstain from such activities.26 Section 7 further safeguards an employee’s
right to self-organization and to collectively bargain with an employer.27
The Board has interpreted these protections broadly with the understanding
that the underlying purpose of the Act was to suppress workplace disputes
arising from employers refusing to bargain with their employees.28
Although security of employee rights under the NLRA is more
commonly associated with union activity, section 7 further extends to “other
concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection.”29 The Act lists two
types of protected concerted activities—those engaged in for the purpose
of collective bargaining and those engaged in for other mutual aid or
protection.30 Thus, the protected activity must be both “concerted” in
nature and must be aimed at either collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection. A “concerted activity” does not necessarily require direct
group action; rather, the Board will look to the purpose and effect of the
activity.31 For example, if an individual employee has been designated to
act on the behalf of a group of employees, that individual is deemed to be
engaging in concerted activities.32 Also, courts have held that the actions
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States . . . [to protect] the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.”).
25. Id. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment . . . .”).
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. See id. § 151.
29. Id. § 157.
30. See id.
31. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2836.
32. Id.
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of a single employee, intended to initiate group activity, meet the
concerted activity requirement.33
In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
Congress intended the “mutual aid and protection” clause to broaden the
scope of protection beyond actions associated with union activity.34
Section 7 therefore includes concerted activities “in support of employees
of employers other than their own,”35 and also efforts “seeking to improve
the terms and conditions of employment or to otherwise improve their
circumstances as employees through means other than the immediate
employee-employer relationship.”36
If scholarship athletes are employees under the NLRA, then they
would be entitled to each of these rights listed in section 7, meaning that
they would be permitted to form collective bargaining units and engage in
non-union concerted activity for their protection. The Act empowers the
National Labor Relations Board to resolve federal labor law disputes and
therefore empowers the Board to determine the status of college athletes.
D. The NLRB
The NLRB is tasked with administering and enforcing the NLRA and
is composed of a five-member panel,37 the General Counsel, and 33
Regional Offices.38 The two primary functions of the Board are remedying
unfair labor practices, as defined by the Act, and conducting representation
proceedings to determine the status of labor organizations.39
1. Authority of the NLRB
Fundamentally, the NLRB is an administrative agency that obtains its
authority from Congress through the NLRA.40 Congress’s power to
regulate labor-management relations is limited by the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution, which restricts Congressional regulation to enterprises
33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Caval Tool Div., Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 262
F.3d 184, 186 (2d Cir. 2001).
34. Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978).
35. Id. at 564; see, e.g., NLRB v. J.G. Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1943)
(finding a right to express sympathy for striking employees of another employer).
36. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565.
37. Board Members are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate
for five-year terms. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2824–25.
38. BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 9, at 33.
39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(b)–(c), 160(a) (2012).
40. Id. § 153.
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whose operations affect commerce.41 Therefore, the Board’s authority is
limited to cases in which an employer’s operations “affect commerce.”42
The NLRB’s authority extends only to “employers” under the Act, and
section 2(2), which defines the term “employer,” excludes “the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof.”43 Therefore,
publicly owned state colleges and universities are not subject to the
Board’s authority. Rather, only private institutions, like Northwestern
University, are governed by the NLRA.44
Every case before the NLRB begins in the regional offices, either with
the filing of petitions in representation cases or through charges brought
against an employer in unfair labor practice cases.45 Each regional office
is under the immediate direction of a regional director that investigates all
petitions and charges, conducts representation hearings and elections, and
prosecutes unfair labor practice cases.46 Through this procedure, the
Northwestern football players began their effort toward unionization by
filing a representation petition with the regional director’s office in
Chicago.47
2. Representation Procedure
The Board has delegated its authority in all representation matters to
its regional directors.48 Section 9(c) of the Act outlines the procedure for
representation cases, which begins with the filing of a petition in the
appropriate regional office.49 Once the petition is filed, the regional staff
conducts investigation proceedings to gauge the viability of the individuals’
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
42. BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 9, at
33. “Commerce” is understood to include “trade, traffic, transportation, or
communication within the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United
States; or between any State or Territory and any other State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia; or between two points in the same state, but through any
other State, Territory, the District of Columbia, or a foreign country.” Id.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
44. Id.
45. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2830.
46. Id.
47. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No.
167 (Aug. 17, 2015).
48. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2841.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
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claim.50 Following the investigation and formal representation hearing, the
hearing officer submits a report to the regional director summarizing the
issues of the case without making any recommendations.51 The final decision
by the regional director includes a finding of facts, the conclusions of law,
and either a direction of election or an order dismissing the petition.52 In
any case in which the regional director issues a ruling, any party may file
a request for the Board to review that decision.53 The NLRB has reviewed
the status of numerous potential bargaining units through this procedure,
including those composed of certain types of graduate students, which
could be analogized to any potential group of college athletes.54
II. EARLY NLRB DECISIONS
The National Labor Relations Board recognized that the Northwestern
football team’s petition presented an issue of first impression, in that the
Board had never been asked to determine the status of college athletes
under the NLRA.55 However, the Board has often been called upon to
determine the status of other types of students in the academic arena. 56
Graduate students frequently perform teaching functions, generally under
the direct supervision of faculty members, while receiving financial
assistance to attend the university—thus, these graduate students would
presumably meet the common law master-servant test for employees.57
Nevertheless, for many years, the Board found graduate assistants to be
“primarily students” and thus excluded from coverage under the Act.58
Then, in 2000, faced with a petition by graduate students at New York
50. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 2836. Specifically, the
staff will determine whether the Board has jurisdiction, whether there is a
sufficient showing of interest, whether there exist statutory or policy reasons for
precluding an election, and will establish the scope and composition of the
collective bargaining unit. Id.
51. Id. at 2840.
52. 29 C.F.R. §102.67(a)–(b) (2016).
53. Id.
54. See infra Part II.
55. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No.
167 (Aug. 17, 2015).
56. See, e.g., Trustees of Columbia Univ., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23,
2016); see also Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004); N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B.
1205 (2000); The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974);
Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972).
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
58. See, e.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 640; see also The Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. at 623.
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University, the Board reconsidered its position and held that certain
graduate students were employees under section 2(3).59 The Board
subsequently returned to its original stance and determined that graduate
assistants were not employees within the meaning of the Act.60 Recently,
the Board returned to its reasoning in New York University61 and applied the
master-servant test to a group of graduate students from Columbia
University.62 The Board ultimately determined that the students were
employees under the NLRA.63 Thus, as it stands, graduate students at private
universities are covered by the NLRA and are able to avail themselves of
the rights granted therein. Were the Board to deliberate on the status of
college athletes under the Act, it would likely incorporate, or at least
consider, its reasoning in the graduate student cases. A survey of the Board’s
line of graduate student decisions may reveal how the Board would
determine the status of college athletes under the Act.
A. Pre-New York University Decisions
If an individual is not excluded by section 2(3), then the individual is
assumed to be an employee. Therefore, under this rule, the Board does not
ordinarily face much difficulty in determining whether an individual is an
“employee” under the Act.64 However, the Board has excluded certain
categories of individuals not expressly listed in section 2(3).65 In a line of
decisions beginning in the 1970s, the Board held that graduate students
working in teaching positions are not employees and therefore cannot be
included in a bargaining unit because their inclusion would go against the
purposes of the Act.66
In Adelphi University, the Board excluded graduate student assistants
from a unit of regular faculty members, finding that the graduate assistants

59. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1206 (reasoning that graduate students are
employees, despite also being students, because they are paid to perform services
under the direction of faculty supervisors).
60. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 490 (holding that the imposition of collective
bargaining on graduate students would intrude on the educational processes and that
policy reasons called for excluding the students from coverage).
61. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205.
62. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016).
63. Id. at *12–13.
64. Id. at *4.
65. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487–88.
66. See, e.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972); see also The
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974).

594

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

were “primarily students.”67 The Board emphasized that the students’
employment was entirely dependent on their working toward academic
degrees and that they were under the supervision of regular faculty
members.68 The Board, however, did not determine whether the graduate
students were “employees” as defined by the Act and correspondingly
whether they had the right to collectively bargain.69 Rather, it found that
because the individuals were primarily students, they did not enjoy a
“community of interest” with the faculty sufficient to warrant inclusion in
the bargaining unit consisting solely of regular faculty members.70 Two
years after Adelphi, the Board took the next step and held that graduate
research assistants were not employees within the meaning of section 2(3)
because they were “primarily students.”71
The Board reiterated its position on students performing services directly
related to an educational program when faced with the status of medical
interns, residents, and fellows obtaining medical degrees.72 In St. Clare’s
Hospital, the Board cited its earlier graduate student cases as denying them
the right to be represented separately.73 The Board emphasized that the
individuals served primarily as students rather than as employees of the
teaching hospital.74 The “mutual interest” of the students and the educational
institution in the service was predominantly educational, rather than
economic, making them primarily students and, therefore, outside of the
coverage of the NLRA.75
In Boston Medical Center, the Board overruled Cedars-Sinai and St.
Clare’s and held that medical students performing services in a hospital were
employees within section 2(3).76 The Board interpreted the breadth of section
67. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 640.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. at 621–23 (specifying
various factors to show that the individuals were primarily students, including (1)
the research assistants were graduate students enrolled as Ph.D. candidates at the
university; (2) the research assistants were required to perform research to obtain
their degree; (3) the research assistants received academic credit for their work;
and (4) the stipend was actually financial aid that was not dependent on the nature
or value of their services or the individual skill of the recipients).
72. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976); St. Clare’s Hosp.
and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977) (attempting to better explain the
Board’s decision in Cedars-Sinai).
73. St. Clare’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Bos. Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 168 (1999).
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2(3) expansively and the list of exclusions narrowly—meaning that the
medical students were within the meaning of “employee” unless there
existed some statutory or policy reasons for exclusion.77 However, the
Board did not address the status of graduate assistants who had not yet
received academic degrees, meaning that Boston Medical did not overturn
the Board’s decisions in Adelphi and Leland Stanford.78
The decision in Boston Medical, although not binding on graduate
students, raised the question of whether graduate students were also
employees based on similar reasoning. In 2000, the Board revisited the
status of graduate students under the NLRA and in doing so, imposed
dramatic changes to federal labor law.79
B. New York University
In New York University, the Board shifted its stance on graduate
students, declaring that graduate assistants from New York University
(“NYU”) were employees and therefore were entitled to organize and
bargain with the university, despite also being enrolled as students.80
Relying on similar reasoning as in Boston Medical Center, the Board
rejected the argument that the graduate students were precluded from
coverage simply because they were students.81 The Board recognized that
the term “employee,” as it is used in section 2(3), incorporates common
law agency doctrine.82 Because the graduate students worked as teachers
and researchers under the control of the department administrators, and
were paid for their work, they were clearly employees under the common
law and section 2(3) of the Act.83
First, the Board rejected NYU’s position that the case was
distinguishable from Boston Medical Center.84 The Board also disagreed
77. Id. at 160.
78. Id.
79. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205 (2000).
80. Id. at 1209.
81. See id. at 1205 (“We reject the contention . . . that, because the graduate
assistants may be ‘predominantly students,’ they cannot be statutory employees. . . .
[W]e find there is no basis to deny collective-bargaining rights to statutory employees
merely because they are employed by an educational institution in which they are
enrolled as students.”).
82. See id. at 1205–06 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S.
85, 93–95 (1995)).
83. See id. at 1206.
84. See id. at 1206–07. The university argued that the students differed from
the medical students in three ways: (1) the housestaff in Boston Medical spent
80% of their time providing services for the hospital, compared to the graduate
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that the amount of time spent working was relevant to the determination
that an individual is covered under the Act, citing previous decisions in
which it had found that part-time faculty constituted an appropriate
bargaining unit.85 Next, the Board confirmed that the graduate students
were compensated for their work.86 The fact that the students did not
receive any academic credit for their work underlined the notion that they
were performing services in exchange for pay.87 Finally, the Board
disposed of the argument that the students were performing services in
furtherance of their degree, again emphasizing that the duties performed
were not rendered as a requirement for obtaining their degree.88
NYU alternatively argued that policy reasons required the Board to
exclude the students from coverage under the Act even if the graduate
students were statutory employees.89 In response, the Board compared the
relationship between the graduate students and the university to the
unquestionably economic relationship between the faculty and the
university.90 The Board cited its longstanding practice of approving units
composed of faculty members at private colleges and universities, without
fear of infringing on academic freedom.91
The Board stressed that its historic interpretation of the Act rejected a
narrow reading that bars individuals from coverage simply because they
are simultaneously enrolled as students.92 The graduate students satisfied
students spending only 15% of their time performing teaching and research duties
for the university; (2) the graduate students received financial aid, rather than
compensation, for their services, unlike the housestaff; and (3) the graduate
students performed their duties as a step toward obtaining their degree, while the
housestaff already had their degrees. Id.
85. See id. at 1206 (citing Univ. of S.F., 265 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1982)).
86. See id. at 1206–07.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1207 (“[I]t is undisputed that working as a graduate assistant is not a
requirement for obtaining a graduate degree in most departments. Nor is it part of
the graduate student curriculum in most departments. Therefore, notwithstanding
any educational benefit derived from graduate assistants’ employment, we reject the
premise of the Employer’s argument that graduate assistants should be denied
collective-bargaining rights because their work is primarily educational.”).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1208 (“Indeed in some respects the graduate assistants’ working
conditions are no different from those of the Employer’s regular faculty.”).
91. Id. (“After nearly 30 years of experience with bargaining units of faculty
members, we are confident that in bargaining concerning units of graduate
students, the parties can ‘confront any issues of academic freedom as they would
any other issue in collective bargaining.’”).
92. See id. at 1209.
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the common law master-servant test and were therefore entitled to the
rights enumerated in the Act.93 Under cases such as Adelphi University and
Leland Stanford, graduate students were excluded from coverage under
the National Labor Relations Act.94 After New York University, graduate
students were recognized as employees and therefore granted section 7
rights provided to all employees, marking a major shift in employees’
rights under the Act.95
C. Brown University
Four years after New York University, the Board was again presented
with a question regarding the status of graduate students.96 In a three to
two decision, the Board overturned New York University, concluding that
it had been decided incorrectly and returning to its previous rule of
excluding graduate students from the Act.97 The policy reasons cited by
the majority opinion provide some insight into the Board’s interpretation
of the scope of the NLRA.
1. Majority Opinion
The Board’s decision in Brown advocated consistency with the overall
purpose of the NLRA—to reduce industrial strife and unrest resulting from
an inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees.98
The fundamental premise of the Act envisioned an economic relationship
between the opposing parties, which is why the Board had historically
declined to assert jurisdiction over relationships that were “primarily
educational.”99
The majority considered the graduate students’ relationship with the
university and determined that they were primarily students because the
bulk of their time was committed to obtaining a degree and their service
as graduate assistants was part of their degree requirement.100 The fact that
93. Id.
94. See supra Part II.A.
95. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205.
96. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
97. See id. at 483 (“[NYU] reversed more than 25 years of Board precedent.
That precedent was never successfully challenged in court or in Congress. In our
decision today, we return to the Board’s pre-NYU precedent that graduate students
are not statutory employees.”).
98. See id. at 487–88.
99. See id. at 488.
100. Id.
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their status as graduate assistants was contingent on their enrollment as
students further convinced the Board members that the overall relationship
between the graduate assistants and the university was primarily educational
rather than economic.101
In contrasting the student-teacher relationship with the employeremployee relationship, the Board contended that the Act was not meant to
cover relationships between the students and the university.102 In the
majority’s opinion, applying the collective bargaining process to educational
decisions “would be of ‘dubious value’ because educational concerns are
largely irrelevant to wages, hours, and working conditions.”103 The Board
further distinguished the personal nature of the educational process, in which
students work individually with teachers on a daily basis, from collective
bargaining, which is predicated on the collective treatment of represented
individuals.104
For these reasons the Board concluded that the collective bargaining
process would have a detrimental effect on the educational process, which is
why predominantly educational relationships were traditionally not covered
by the Act.105 The Board reverted to its longstanding precedent that graduate
students are outside the definition of “employee” under the NLRA.106
2. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting members argued that the Board should continue to
apply common law agency principles to determine that graduate students
are employees within the meaning of section 2(3).107 The dissent’s
reasoning, which was recently relied upon by the Board to overturn Brown,
provides insight into how the Board characterizes graduate students, and
potentially college athletes, today.
The dissenting members found two major flaws in the majority’s
conclusion that the Act could not be “imposed blindly on the academic
world.”108 First, the majority failed to acknowledge the statutory principles
that governed the case, namely, the plain, expansive language of section

101. Id. at 489.
102. See id.
103. Id. (citing St. Clare’s Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977)).
104. See id. at 489–90.
105. Id. at 493.
106. See id.
107. See id. (anticipating scenarios where students are bargaining with their
teachers over how many tests to administer per semester, for example).
108. Id. at 494.
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2(3).109 The dissent cited New York University for the proposition that the
Board must give effect to the plain meaning of the language in section 2(3)
and apply the master-servant test to the graduate students.110 According to
the dissent, the majority’s decision effectively excluded individuals who
meet the statutory definition of employees.111 Second, the majority rested
its decision on “fundamental misunderstandings of contemporary higher
education” that minimized the economic relationship between the graduate
students and Brown.112 Given the evolving nature of universities, which
has become a workplace for many, including students, the dissent
maintained that the policies of the Act should apply to the academic setting
as well.113
In sum, the dissent claimed that the Board had overstepped its
authority by ignoring the broad statutory language of the Act and had
overruled New York University without any valid rationale for doing so.114
The issues that brought the graduate students before the Board did not fade
and were again addressed by the Board in 2016.115
D. Still Up for Debate
If Heisman Trophy-winning running back Herschel Walker and the
National Labor Relations Board have one thing in common, it is the ability
to keep the public on its toes.116 Throughout his career, Walker bewildered
defenses by shifting and spinning his way into the end zone.117 The Board

109. Id. at 494–95.
110. Id. at 495 (citing N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000)).
111. Id. at 495–96.
112. Id. at 494, 497.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 500.
115. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016).
116. See Michael Luck, Happier Times: When the Dogs Had Herschel Walker,
DAWGNATION.COM, https://www.dawgnation.com/football/happier-times-when-thedogs-had-herschel-walker [https://perma.cc/ZVP2-7Y2S] (last visited Sept. 5, 2016);
see also Scott Jaschik, NLRB Returns to Grad Student Unions, INSIDEHIGHERED.COM
(Oct. 23, 2015, 10:17 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/10/23/nlrbreturns-issue-graduate-student-unions-private-institutions [https://perma.cc/9LFX-M
DUG].
117. Herschel Walker won the 1982 Heisman Trophy, which is awarded to the top
college football player in the country. In his college and professional career, Walker
totaled 113 touchdowns. See Herschel Walker, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
http://www.nfl.com/player/herschelwalker/2503506/careerstats [https://perma.cc/CDN
6-XQ52] (last visited Sept. 5, 2016); Herschel Walker, SPORTS-REFERENCE.COM,
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has displayed similar light-footedness when it comes to establishing the
status of graduate students under the NLRA. In 2016, the Board revisited
Brown University and ultimately overruled the decision, holding that
graduate students “who have a common-law employment relationship
with their university are statutory employees under the Act.”118
Relying largely on the dissenting members’ reasoning in Brown
University, the Board found that the Brown University Board had erred by
determining that graduate students could not be treated as employees.119
Rather, given the breadth of section 2(3), students could be employees of
a university while also being students.120 In fact, the absence of graduate
students from the excluded categories of individuals was a strong
indication of coverage.121 The Board rejected the claim in Brown
University that finding graduate students to be statutory employees is
incompatible with the “underlying fundamental premise of the Act” and
held that, where an employment relationship exists, there should be
compelling reasons for excluding a group of workers from coverage.122 In
this regard, the Board noted that the extent of the economic aspect of an
employment relationship has always been “the payment of tangible
compensation.”123 Accordingly, the Columbia University Board overruled
Brown University and held that graduate students are entitled to the full
panoply of section 7 rights granted to employees when there exists a
common law employment relationship between the students and their
university.124
http://www.sports-reference.com/cfb/players/herschel-walker-1.html [https://perma.cc
/U557-8PNX] (last visited Sept. 5, 2016).
118. Brown Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *2 (Aug. 23, 2016).
119. Id. (“Where student assistants have an employment relationship with their
university under the common law test [...] this relationship is sufficient to establish
that the student assistant is a Section 2(3) employee for all statutory purposes.”).
120. Id. (citing Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995)) (“The
‘phrasing of the Act,’ as the Court has pointed out, ‘seems to reiterate the breadth
of the ordinary dictionary definition’ of the term, a definition that ‘includes any
person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation.’”).
121. See id.
122. Id. at *5 (“The Act is designed to cover a particular type of ‘economic
relationship’ – an employment relationship – and where that relationship exists,
there should be compelling reasons before the Board excludes a category of
workers from the Act’s coverage.”).
123. Id. at *6 (“Even when such an economic component may seem
comparatively slight, relative to other aspects of the relationship between worker
and employer, the payment of compensation, in conjunction with the employer’s
control, suffices to establish an employment relationship for purposes of the Act.”).
124. Id. at 13.
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In assessing the Northwestern players’ representation petition, the
NLRB specifically addressed the similarities and differences between the
claims made by the athletes and those previously set forth by the graduate
students.125 Although the Board’s decisions regarding graduate students
are not perfectly applicable to scholarship athletes, the decisions provide
some insight into the Board’s reasoning and motivation for determining
whether certain individuals are, or are not, employees under the Act.
III. NORTHWESTERN TACKLES THE ISSUE
Northwestern University is a private institution with its main campus
in Evanston, Illinois.126 The university is a member of both the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and the Big Ten Conference (“Big
Ten”).127 These organizations dictate the regulations under which the athletes
compete, such as the maximum number of scholarships a school may award
and the minimum academic requirements for athletes.128 Northwestern’s
football team competes in the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”),
which consists of approximately 125 institutions, only 17 of which are private
colleges or universities, including Northwestern.129 Northwestern is the only
private school in the 14-member Big Ten.130
During the 2012–2013 academic year, the school’s football team
consisted of 112 athletes, 85 of whom received a grant-in-aid scholarship
valued at roughly $61,000 per academic year.131 This amount is based on
tuition, fees, room, board, and books; the scholarship funds are directly
applied to those expenses.132 Before receiving the grant-in-aid scholarship,
each player receives a “tender” from the university specifying that the
scholarship is subject to compliance with the policies and regulations of
Northwestern, the NCAA, and the Big Ten.133 After accepting the
scholarship, players are required to devote substantial hours to football
activities, while simultaneously remaining full-time students.134

125. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No.
167, at *3–4 (Aug. 17, 2015).
126. Id. at *2.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Because these athletes are subject to such rigorous expectations, they
believed that they were entitled to certain rights awarded to traditional
employees. In January 2014, Ramogi Huma, president of the National
College Players Association, filed a petition for representation in Region
13 of the NLRB in Chicago on behalf of scholarship football players at
Northwestern University who sought to form a collective bargaining unit
under the NLRA.135
A. Touchdown for the Players
On March 26, 2014, the director of Region 13 of the NLRB held that
the Northwestern scholarship football players were employees under
section 2(3) and ordered an election to be conducted by all eligible
players.136 Decided prior to the Board’s decision in Columbia University,
the director held that the standard set forth in Brown University was not
applicable to the scholarship athletes and instead employed common law
principles.137 The director found that the scholarship players performed
services for Northwestern under a contract of hire, subject to
Northwestern’s control, in return for payment and therefore met the
standard for employee status under section 2(3).138
Accordingly, the director ordered an immediate election to be
conducted by all eligible scholarship football players.139 By allowing
players a seat at the bargaining table for the first time, the decision had the
potential to change the landscape of college football. Under the regional
director’s decision, scholarship athletes were given coverage under the
National Labor Relations Act and consequently all of the rights afforded
to employees under section 7.
B. Northwestern Throws the Challenge Flag
On April 24, 2014, the Board granted Northwestern’s request for review
of the regional director’s decision, finding that it “raise[d] substantial issues

135. See Farrey, supra note 4.
136. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *7. Players deemed
eligible to vote in the election were all football players receiving football grantin-aid scholarships that had not yet exhausted their playing eligibility at
Northwestern University. Id.
137. Id. at *13.
138. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of the application of the common law
test to scholarship college athletes see infra Part.IV.B.3.
139. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *23.

2016]

COMMENT

603

warranting review.”140 The Board invited the parties and any interested
amici to address the issues raised in the case, specifically requesting that the
parties and amici address certain issues that it deemed central to the case.141
First, the Board inquired as to the appropriate standard for determining
whether the scholarship players are employees under the Act and the
proper result applying that standard to the scholarship players.142 Second,
the Board asked whether Brown University was applicable to the case and
whether the Board should adhere to, modify, or overrule Brown.143 Parties
were also invited to raise any policy considerations relevant to the
determination of the players’ status under the Act.144 Finally, assuming
that the scholarship players were employees under the Act, the Board
questioned whether it should consider the existence of “outside
constraints” that would alter the players’ ability to collectively bargain.145
C. After Further Review
Almost 18 months after Northwestern appealed the regional director’s
decision, the Board announced its much-anticipated ruling.146 A decision
affirming the regional director would have profound ramifications on
college football and would verify what many had been arguing for years—
that college athletes are employees of their respective universities.
Alternatively, a reversal would render a significant blow to the campaign
for athletes’ rights in the ever-evolving world of college football.
In a unanimous decision, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over
the Northwestern scholarship football players, contending that a decision
on the merits “would not effectuate the policies of the Act.”147 The Board
140. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No.
167 (Apr. 24, 2014) (order).
141. See Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B.
No. 167 (May 24, 2014) (notice and inv. to file briefs).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. The Board also asked for feedback on an alternative in which it
would recognize the scholarship athletes as employees, but preclude them from
being represented in any bargaining unit, similar to the exception the Board has
made for confidential employees. Id.
146. See Farrey, supra note 4.
147. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167,
at *1, *3 (Aug. 17, 2015) (“After carefully considering the arguments of the parties
and interested amici, we find that it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction in this case, even if we assume, without deciding, that the grantin-aid scholarship players are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3).”).
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emphasized the nature and control exercised by sports leagues—here, the
NCAA and the Big Ten—over individual teams.148 Further, the structure
of FBS football, which is overwhelmingly composed of public institutions,
meant that the Board’s decision would apply only to a small minority of
teams competing in the relevant market.149
Given the novelty of the players’ petition, the Board was unsure of the
standard to apply to the athletes, since the players “d[id] not fit into any
analytical framework that the Board ha[d] used in cases involving other
types of students or athletes.”150 In this regard, the Board distinguished the
scholarship football players, whose football activities were unrelated to
their educational endeavors, from the graduate students in Brown and New
York University.151
The Board declined to consider the college athletes as conventional
professional athletes in undisputedly professional leagues, given the
additional academic requirements and NCAA regulations placed on the
players.152 Moreover, even if the Board were to consider college athletes
as analogous to professionals for purposes of collective bargaining, the
Board had never been faced with a bargaining unit consisting of a single
team’s players competing against teams completely outside of the Board’s
jurisdiction.153
The Board also addressed characteristics of college football, specifically,
the FBS, which made it unlikely that a decision on the merits would promote
labor stability.154 The Board indicated that the “symbiotic relationship”
between FBS universities and the NCAA meant that conducting college
football games requires direct interaction between the various institutions.155
From this highly interdependent relationship among the FBS teams and the
NCAA, the Board envisioned a ripple effect that its decision would have

148. Id. at *3.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at *3–4, *3 n.10 (“The fact that the scholarship players are students
who are also athletes receiving a scholarship to participate in what has
traditionally been regarded as an extracurricular activity (albeit a nationally
prominent and extraordinarily lucrative one for many universities, conferences,
and the NCAA) materially sets them apart from the Board’s student precedent.”)
(emphasis added).
152. See id. at *4.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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throughout the FBS.156 Given the high degree of association required of
member universities, labor issues involving only one team would likely
affect other teams, making it unlikely that a Board decision on the
Northwestern players’ case would promote labor stability.157
The Board also determined that the structure of FBS football made it
difficult for the Board to promote stability.158 Because the Board’s
jurisdiction is limited to private institutions, a decision on the merits would
affect only a small fraction of the schools competing in FBS football,159
unlike any of the Board’s prior decisions involving professional sports.160
Since Northwestern is the only private institution in the Big Ten, the Board
would be unable to assert jurisdiction over the school’s primary
competitors.161 This inconsistency could lead to circumstances in which
schools that directly compete against each other are governed by
inconsistent laws, as some states permit collective bargaining by public
employees and others prohibit or limit it.162 The Board concluded that a
decision on the merits in the context of this case would lead to an “inherent
asymmetry” not present in other cases in which the Board had asserted
jurisdiction.163 Therefore, to assert jurisdiction would not promote stability
in labor relations.164
Although a decision on the merits was not reached, the Board insisted
that its decision was limited to the facts in this particular case.165 The
Board declined to address the potential for another set of facts meeting the
jurisdictional requirement of promoting labor stability; specifically, a
156. See id. at *4–5 (“Many terms applied to one team therefore would likely
have ramifications for other teams.”).
157. Id. at *5.
158. See id.
159. As of October 2015, the FBS consists of 128 member schools, 17 of which
are private institutions that are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. See NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS’N, http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec2/sponsorship
?sortOrder=0&division=1A&sport=MFB [https://perma.cc/2CZJ-9TFD] (last visited
Sept. 20, 2016).
160. See Northwestern. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B.
No. 167, at *5 (“This too is a situation without precedent because in all of our past
cases involving professional sports, the Board was able to regulate all, or at least
most, of the teams in the relevant league or association.”).
161. The Board provides two examples in which state law specifically restricts
scholarship athletes from being labeled “employees” for labor law purposes. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at *1 (“Our decision today is limited to the grant-in-aid scholarship
football players covered by the petition in this particular case . . . .”).
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petition brought by football players at all 17 private colleges and
universities in the FBS.166 So, as the saying goes, when the National Labor
Relations Board closes a door, it leaves every other door and window in
the house open and forgets to set the alarm.
IV. RETURNING THE PUNT
By punting in the Northwestern case, the Board declined to resolve the
issue of college athletes’ status under the NLRA. Still, the Board was
careful to leave the issue open for future groups of athletes to petition for
representation. Arguably, some hypothetical group of college athletes
exists that could compel the Board to assert jurisdiction. Based on this
possibility, this Comment proposes a two-part solution for the Board to
resolve the issues surrounding the employment status of college athletes.
First, the Board should employ its reasoning in cases like Trustees of
Columbia University and New York University and apply the common law
test to college athletes, as well as graduate students. Second, after
recognizing the employee status of these individuals, the Board should
create a separate category of employees composed of scholarship college
athletes that meet the definition of “employee” under the Act.
A. Apply the Common Law Test to Both College Athletes and Graduate
Students
As the Board noted in Columbia University, the nature of the modern
academic setting, as well as the plain language of the NLRA, has rendered the
“primarily student” standard applied by the Board in cases like Adelphi
University and Brown University no longer viable.167 Largely for the reasons
set forth by the dissent in Brown University and the majority in Columbia
University, the Board should apply the common law definition of “employee”
to college athletes.168 Application of the common law master-servant standard
leads to the conclusion that these scholarship athletes are in fact employees
under the Act.

166. Id. at *6.
167. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B.
483 (2004).
168. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000); Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 483.
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1. Contemporary Academic Reality
The landscape of colleges and universities is much different than when
the Board first considered the status of graduate students under the Act.169 The
academic setting has taken on a different role for many students, operating as
both a workplace and an educational environment.170 Therefore, it is no longer
practical to perceive colleges and universities as predominantly academic, and
thus exclude students from coverage under the NLRA.171
One commentator has discussed the conversion of the academic
landscape, considering the development of student bargaining units, and the
dissenting members in Brown University quoted him at length.172 This
transformation has resulted in individuals who were once unquestionably
students taking on the duties once devoted to tenured professors.173 By
restricting individuals who perform similar functions as traditional employees
of the university simply because they also happen to be students, the Board
took an arcane viewpoint of the educational institution that is no longer the
norm of present-day higher education. In Columbia University, the Board
updated its approach and now embraces this contemporary role of educational
institutions, at least as it applies to graduate students.174
2. Clear Statutory Language
In Brown University, the majority excluded graduate students based on
the fact that their relationship with the university was “primarily
educational.”175 In Columbia University, the Board held that excluding
individuals from coverage under the Act purely based on their simultaneous
status as students is inconsistent with the broad interpretation of section 2(3)
that both the Board and the Supreme Court have adhered to for decades.176
For the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, an employee is “any
169. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 497.
170. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *4 (Aug. 23, 2016).
171. See, e.g., The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
172. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 498 (quoting Daniel J. Julius & Patricia
J. Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization: Catalysts and Consequences, 26
REV. HIGHER EDUC. 187, 191, 196 (2002)).
173. Daniel J. Julius & Patricia J. Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization:
Catalysts and Consequences, 26 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 187, 191, 197 (2002).
174. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90.
175. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487.
176. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *4–6; see also
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995); Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984); Seattle Opera Ass’n, 331 N.L.R.B. 1072 (2000).

608

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

employee” not specifically excluded by Congress in section 2(3).177 The Act
does not exclude statutory employees on the basis that their employment
relationship is not the principal relationship with their employer, and
accordingly, the Board is restricted from unilaterally making such
exclusions.178
In NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., the Supreme Court found
that the broad interpretation of the Act’s definition of employee seemed to
echo the scope of the ordinary dictionary definition.179 In Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, the Court found the scope of section 2(3) “striking” and “squarely
appl[ying] to ‘any employee’” with the exception of the specific exclusions
listed in the Act.180 The Board has followed the Court’s interpretation and
given a broad reading of the definition of employee.181 In Sundland
Construction Co., the Board reiterated that the statute applied in the absence
of express exclusion.182 Because the Act does not expressly exclude college
athletes, and because the Board now recognizes that graduate students can
be employees under the Act, the Board should adhere to the plain language
of section 2(3), which reflects the common law master-servant relationship.
B. Under the Common Law, Scholarship Athletes Are Employees
Commentators have applied the common law master-servant test to
college athletes and have almost invariably found that scholarship athletes
are employees under the common law.183 In Northwestern University, the
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
178. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *6 (“The
fundamental error of the Brown University Board was to frame the issue of
statutory coverage not in terms of the existence of an employment relationship,
but rather on whether some other relationship between the employee and the
employer is the primary one [...].”); see also Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 496
(“Absent compelling indications of Congressional intent, the Board simply is not
free to create an exclusion from the Act’s coverage for a category of workers who
meet the literal statutory definition of employees.”).
179. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 90 (quoting the dictionary
definition of employee as including “any person who works for another in return
for financial or other compensation”).
180. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 891.
181. See, e.g., Sundland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1226 (1992).
182. Id. (“Under the well settled principle of statutory construction—expressio
unius est exclusio alterius—only these enumerated classifications are excluded
from the definition of ‘employee.’”).
183. See, e.g., Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth
of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71,
97–117 (2006) (finding that certain college athletes meet the common law
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regional director explained that, “[u]nder the common law definition, an
employee is a person who performs services for another under a contract of
hire, subject to another’s control or right of control, and in return for
payment.”184 Applying this definition to scholarship athletes in revenuegenerating sports at FBS institutions yields the conclusion that these
individuals are employees under the common law: they perform services for
the obvious benefit of their university under an agreement setting forth their
responsibilities and compensation and are subject to the control of their
coaches and the university virtually every day while they are employed by
the school.185
1. The Players Perform Services for their Respective Universities
From 2003 to 2012, Northwestern’s football program generated
revenues of approximately $235 million through ticket sales, television
contracts, merchandise sales, and licensing agreements.186 During the
2012–2013 academic year, the football program generated approximately
$30 million in revenue, while incurring close to $22 million in expenses.187
That revenue was derived from ticket sales, Big Ten broadcast contracts,
stadium rights, and merchandise sales.188 The substantial revenue and
profits that FBS universities generally collect from fielding a football team
demonstrates that scholarship athletes clearly provide services for the
benefit of their university.
2. The Daily Lives of Scholarship Athletes Are Subject to Strict
Control of the University
The degree of control that FBS universities exercise over scholarship
athletes is also detailed in the regional director’s opinion in the
standard for “employee”); see also William B. Gould IV et al., Full Court Press:
Northwestern University, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 1 (2014) (arguing that scholarship college football players are under the
control of the universities and therefore meet the common law definition of
employee).
184. Northwestern Univ. & College Athletes Players Association, No. 13-RC121359, 2014 WL 1246914, at *12 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014), review granted,
362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Apr. 24, 2014) (order).
185. See id. at *14.
186. Id. at *11 (also finding that the university incurred $159 million in
expenses during this period, for a profit of approximately $76 million).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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Northwestern case.189 One could argue that the athletes are subject to more
control by their universities than any other “traditional” employees of the
university, such as faculty members or student library workers. For
instance, the players at Northwestern begin training camp approximately
six weeks prior to the start of the academic year.190 From that point until
the end of the football season, the players are required to attend anywhere
from 40 to 60 hours of football-related duties per week and are usually
provided with daily itineraries from the coaching staff.191
In addition to football-related activities, the coaches have control over
nearly every other aspect of the players’ private lives through various rules
and regulations, which the players must follow under threat of discipline
and loss of scholarship.192 In just one illustration of such exacting control,
players are required to remain within a six-hour radius of campus, even
during discretionary weeks, and must submit travel information to their
coaches before departing.193 Commentators have found that scholarship
athletes at other FBS institutions are subject to largely similar standards as
the players at Northwestern.194 Based on the facts established in the
Northwestern football players’ case, one would be hard-pressed to find
any other individual on campus whose living arrangements, travel plans,
and general day-to-day activities are so closely monitored by university
officials.
3. The Athletes’ Grant-in-Aid Functions as Compensation
The grant-in-aid scholarship is provided to the players in return for
their athletic services and acts as compensation provided by the universityemployer. The regional director in Northwestern University found that the
players typically received approximately $61,000 in scholarship aid per
academic year.195 On top of that, upperclassmen electing to live offcampus were provided a monthly stipend between $1,200 and $1,600 to
189. Id. at *15–17.
190. Id. at *13.
191. See id. at *13–14 (detailing the daily itineraries provided to the players,
“which set forth, hour by hour, what football related activities the players are to
engage in from as early as 5:45 a.m. until 10:30 p.m.”).
192. See id. at *14.
193. See id. at *4, *14.
194. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 183, at 109 (surveying
scholarship athletes from multiple FBS institutions and determining that the
players are subject to strict control by their universities, similar to the regional
director’s finding in Northwestern).
195. Northwestern Univ., 2014 WL 1246914, at *2.
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cover their living expenses.196 Although the grants-in-aid are not provided
in the traditional form of a paycheck, the scholarship money nonetheless
constitutes substantial economic benefit for the players.197
Scholars have debated whether the athletic scholarship acts as a form
of compensation that meets the common law requirement.198 At least one
commentator has compared the grant-in-aid scholarship to a contract of
employment, as the terms of the scholarship set forth the obligations of the
athletes and define the resulting economic compensation to be provided.199
Recent litigation in the Ninth Circuit representing the campaign for the
payment of college athletes could also result in major changes to the
structure of college athletics.200 Finally, the fact that the grant-in-aid
scholarships are renewable one-year athletic scholarships, rather than
guaranteed for four years, establishes the quid-pro-quo nature of this
compensation.201 The valuable services provided by these individuals and
the unquestioned control exercised by the coaches and universities,
coupled with the compensatory nature of the athletic scholarship, strongly
indicates that scholarship college athletes meet the common law masterservant test, as applied by the National Labor Relations Board.
C. Modernization of the “Employee”
The Board declined to rule on the status of the Northwestern players
because any decision would only apply to a small fraction of the relevant
labor market.202 The Board’s concern is a legitimate one because the
granting of employee status to college athletes would allow the athletes to
form unions and collectively bargain with their universities over any
number of issues.
1. Collective Bargaining is Not Suited for College Athletics
There are several compelling reasons to preclude college athletes from
joining collective bargaining units. As the Board emphasized, granting
196. Id.
197. Id. at *12.
198. See McCormick & McCormick, supra, note 183, at 108–11.
199. See id. at 108–09; see also Northwestern Univ., 2014 WL 1246914, at
*13 (detailing the tender offer received and signed by the scholarship athletes
when committing to Northwestern).
200. See Samuel M. Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
201. Northwestern Univ., 2014 WL 1246914, at *14.
202. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No.
167, at *5 (Aug. 17, 2015).

612

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

college athletes the right to unionize and collectively bargain would put
them at an extraordinary advantage compared to their counterparts at
public universities in states where athletes are expressly excluded under
state labor law.203 Moreover, college athletes, by definition, are employees
of their university only so long as they remain in college—the maximum
period that a player could be a member of the union is five years, with
many scholarship players leaving much sooner.204 At the very least, the
union would experience a 100% turnover rate in membership every five
years. This high turnover rate does not lend itself to collective bargaining,
as the demands of union membership could theoretically change every
year. Finally, the composition of college football teams in general makes
it difficult for any collective bargaining unit to represent the players
effectively. The NCAA limits FBS institutions to 85 scholarship players
per team.205 However, teams will often field “walk-on” players who do not
receive athletic scholarships, but are nonetheless held to largely similar
standards as the scholarship athletes.206 It is not uncommon for these walkon players to receive substantial playing time alongside scholarship
players.207 Because walk-ons do not receive athletic scholarships, they do
not receive compensation for their services and would not meet the
common law standard for employees. Consequently, any bargaining unit
consisting of college athletes would necessarily exclude walk-ons, who
are intimately connected to union members and who would likely be
affected by union activities. For these reasons, allowing college athletes to
join bargaining units and collectively bargain with their universities would
not effectuate the policies of the NLRA.
However, to contend that these individuals are not at all engaged in an
employment relationship with their universities would be to turn a blind
203. Id. at *5–6 (addressing the variance in federal labor law governing
Northwestern University compared to state labor law of Ohio and Michigan,
which controls public institutions in direct competition with Northwestern).
204. Dennis Dodd, Near-Disastrous Number of Early Entries Declaring for 2016
NFL Draft, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball
/writer/dennis-dodd/25453509/near-disasterous-number-of-underclassmen-declaring
-for-2016-nfl-draft [https://perma.cc/Z3GQ-QD8F].
205. Bylaw 15.5.6.1, reprinted in NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2015–16
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 203 (2015), http://www.ncaapublications.com/product
downloads/D116.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHB4-FP2B].
206. Michael Felder, Examining the Process of Being a College Football WalkOn, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 13, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1591099examining-the-process-of-being-a-college-football-walk-on [https://perma.cc/Y4DFUL35].
207. Id.
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eye to the state of present-day college athletics. As outlined above,
scholarship athletes in revenue-generating sports meet the common law
definition of employee as applied by the NLRB and the Supreme Court.208
Withholding protection under the NLRA from these individuals would
effectively strip them of their rights as employees. College athletes should
not be penalized for the nature of their labor market. Instead of taking an
“all or nothing” approach to section 7 rights, the Board should recognize
a middle ground in which individuals determined to be employees are
granted certain protections under the Act, even if they are precluded from
joining labor unions and collectively bargaining with their employer.
2. A New Group of Employees
College athletes possess certain characteristics that distinguish them
from traditional employees covered under the Act, making it difficult for
the Board to recognize their status as employees.209 In light of these
differences, college athletes should be isolated and incorporated into a
separate category of employees. These athlete–employees would be given
coverage under the NLRA; however, because of their unique position,
athlete–employees would be restricted against forming bargaining units
and engaging in collective bargaining with their universities. If athlete–
employees were barred from collective bargaining and union activities,
then they would not be given an advantage over their opponents at public
universities, concerns over high turnover among the employees would be
extinguished, and scholarship athletes would not be treated substantially
different than their teammates who are not on scholarship. This constraint
would thus circumvent many of the Board’s policy concerns over granting
NLRA coverage to college athletes.210
Although restricted from collective bargaining, athlete–employees
would possess the remaining rights granted by section 7—specifically, the
protection of concerted activity for mutual aid and protection.211 This right
would protect athlete–employees against discharge and other retaliatory

208. See supra Part.IV.B.
209. See supra Part.IV.C.1 (arguing against unionization of college athletes).
210. See Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B.
No. 167, at *5 (Aug. 17, 2015).
211. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
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actions for activities such as work stoppages,212 walkouts,213 strikes,214 and
protests over working conditions.215 Under this proposal, athlete–
employees would be in a better position to protect themselves as statutory
employees, while simultaneously avoiding policy concerns of allowing
college athletes to collectively bargain.
There are some additional considerations arising from this proposed
solution. First, one must consider whether the NLRB even has the
authority to make such a change. Then, if the NLRB does have the
authority, one must consider by what mechanism this change would be
carried out. Because the National Labor Relations Board is an independent
agency created by Congress, administrative law will generally govern any
action taken by the Board.216 An administrative agency is generally given
broad discretion when reasonably interpreting its own enabling statute.217
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
Supreme Court provided a two-step approach to an agency’s interpretation
of its enabling statute.218 First, the reviewing court should determine
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”219
212. See Halstead Metal Prods. v. NLRB, 940 F.2d 66, 70 (4th Cir. 1991)
(finding employees who collectively refuse to work in protest over wages, hours,
or other working conditions are engaged in concerted activities for mutual aid or
protection within meaning of the NLRA and are protected from retaliatory actions
taken by employers for participation in or instigation of such activity).
213. See Charge Card Ass’n v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 272, 275 (6th Cir. 1981) (“A
walkout of unorganized employees is a protected activity under the Act . . . .”).
214. See NLRB v. Rubatex Corp., 601 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding
that a strike is concerted activity within the provision of the NLRA, declaring it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with right of employees to
engage in concerted activities for purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection); see also NLRB v. Imperial Bedding Co., 519 F.2d 1073, 1074–
75 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding a strike in protest of suspension of fellow employee is
a protected activity).
215. See NLRB v. Long Beach Youth Ctr., Inc., 591 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir.
1979) (finding work stoppages in protest of working conditions, even by
unorganized employees, are protected activities); see also Vic Tanny Inter., Inc.
v. NLRB 622 F.2d 237, 240–41 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding four unorganized
employees who jointly participated in walkout to present job-related grievances
to management were engaged in protected activity and employer violated this
section when it discharged them, at least in part, because of their walkout).
216. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012).
217. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns., Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (“[T]he
Board’s determination that specified persons are ‘employees’ under this Act is to be
accepted if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law.”).
218. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
219. Id.

2016]

COMMENT

615

Then, if the enabling statute’s language is unambiguous, the agency must
defer to Congress. However, Congress has a history of granting agencies
interpretive leeway by writing relatively ambiguous enabling statutes.
Under Chevron, if Congress is unclear in its intent, an agency is allowed
to essentially fill in the gaps of its own enabling statute.220 If it is
determined that Congress was either silent or unclear, the reviewing court
will then determine whether the agency’s mandate is reasonable.221 If so,
the court must defer to the agency’s action.
Because this proposal requires an interpretation of the NLRA by the
Board, any action taken by the NLRB will be reviewed in light of
Chevron.222 It could be argued that Congress was unambiguous in section
7 where it identified the rights that all employees “shall have” under the
Act.223 Further, the use of the conjunctive “and” supports the inference that
Congress intended to provide an individual with all of the rights listed in
section 7, provided that the individual was found to be an employee.224 If
a court were to determine that Congress was unambiguous in section 7,
this solution would require a congressional amendment to the NLRA.225
However, if a court found that section 7 was unclear on whether the rights
could be divided and parsed, as this solution proposes, then the Board
would be given broad deference to take reasonable steps to implement this
solution, either through rulemaking or adjudication.226
Opponents may also question the substantive influence of this
proposal—specifically, whether this solution actually provides the
athlete–employee with any rights of significance, considering that the
primary benefit of the Act is meant to encourage collective bargaining. 227
Although a prominent benefit of employee protection under the NLRA is
the right to self-organization and to collectively bargain, the protections
established by this solution should not be discounted. By allowing athlete–
employees to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and
protection, the Board would be providing these individuals with a right
that they do not currently possess—the right to walk out. Although under
the current structure athletes could conceivably unite for a collective
cause, nothing protects these athletes from recourse for doing so. Under
this proposal, an athlete’s scholarship and position on the team would be
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See id. at 843.
Id. at 844.
See id.
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
See id.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See id.
See supra Part I.
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protected if he or she were to engage in these types of protected, concerted
activities under the Act.
CONCLUSION
The growth of college athletics has necessitated a modernization of
the understanding of the rights granted to individuals under the NLRA. To
safeguard the rights of college athletes while continuing to promote the
policies of the Act, either the Board or Congress must take steps toward
reform. Instead of taking an all or nothing approach where college athletes
are excluded based on the perceived problems with imposing collective
bargaining on college athletics, the Board should take a more practical
approach. Whether by administrative procedures or, if necessary,
legislative amendment, the Board should recognize that scholarship
college athletes are employees under the National Labor Relations Act and
should tailor the section 7 rights of employees to fit the labor market of
college football. If the industry of college football is to continue on its
exceptional trajectory, it must adapt to the unique environment in which it
exists, beginning with how it recognizes scholarship student-athletes.
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